You only get substantially higher numbers if you include PMCs, irregular volunteer formations, etc.

Even your own wikipedia source uses Mediazona and shows this LOL:

According to BBC News Russian and the Mediazona news website, out of 97,994 Russian soldiers and contractors whose deaths they had documented by 13 March 2025, 4.9 percent (4,794) were officers, while 6.8 percent (6,636) were Motorized Rifle Troops and 3.3 percent (3,275) were members of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV). In addition, 11.5 percent (11,265) of Russian soldiers whose deaths had been confirmed were people who were mobilized, while 16.4 percent (16,075) were convicts.

I don’t include ‘mobilized’ (which means BARS not conscripts btw) nor do I include convicts. My death totals only include the professionals.

My numbers is a little older than March 15:

hence: Motorized Rifles: 6,457 VDV: 3,257

Yeah, the death toll is likely higher, but the professional death rate likely not so much higher as they are better documented than those from irregulars.

I mean Mediazona also admits that irregular volunteer formations and convicts make up larger portions of losses than professionals:

"From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By March 14, the death of over 4,800 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.

The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers."

The only time when professionals bore the brunt of the losses amongst Russian forces was in winter and early spring of 2022, they were quickly beaten by the blood that was shed from irregular volunteer formations in mid-fall, the death toll amongst irregular volunteer formations were eventually surpassed by prisoners in 2023 before irregular volunteer formations again emerged as highest category among the KIA.